

## Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor—Continued

DISCUSSION 1941—Continued

DATE	REF	FILE	OTHERS	BRIEF
**Dec. 15	N 7400	20308	Tokyo 1206	Explanation of circumstances surrounding December's presentation of Japanese Declaration of War to the U. S. Govt. "We could not suppose that the negotiations had been broken off then, and the shooting had taken place after that. . . . The President's speech was trying to hold the line that the United States had been taken by surprise and failed in the first part." (Doc. 11-229) Forwarded from translations Bureau by teletype.
#Dec. 15	A 7420	20294	Doc 120	Tokyo Circular #120—The Imperial Navy. Air Force attacked above battleship and took them in the attack of Hawaii. These took were the Okinawa, Yamaguchi, and Arima. (Doc. 14-244) (Also see 120.)
#Dec. 16	A 7411	20295	Hawa. 204	Egy report on movements of U. S. Pacific Fleet. (Doc. 16-200) (Note: Intercepted by Army at San Francisco.)
1941				
#Dec. 17	A 7400	20479	Tokyo 24	War News Circular #1. The following report based on what the attacking forces witnessed during the battle as well as photographs observations above the battle, show that we had completely destroyed the United States Fleet and the American Air Force in the Hawaiian region. (Detailed lines reported were very accurate. (Doc. 18-244) (Also see 120.)
#Dec. 26	N 7440	20301	Tok. 100	If the war does start, this will be a war which will decide the rise or fall of the Japanese Empire. . . . It can be imagined that the next war is to be a longer one than the China Incident (Doc. 120) (Doc. 1, 1941.) (Note: Intercepted at Casper, Dec. 1, 1941. Forwarded by Coss in GY 8049 #2 and received Dec. 8, 1941. GY Log #2051)
**Dec. 26	A 8007	20462	Tokyo 121	To Honolulu in view of the present situation, the present is just a question, suppose serious, and present is a great importance. Let me know day by day. What are we to do with whether or not there are any observations beyond that from Hawaii. Also whether or not the war does any progress with our progress. (Doc. 2-114) (Note: Intercepted at Fort Meade, F. D. known for long delay but known, but apparently note was handled the fact. Note on translation says: "This message was received here Dec. 26.")

14 OCT. 44

## EXHIBIT No. 24

SECRET

## [1] SUMMARY OF FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS RELATING TO JAPAN'S WAR POTENTIAL AND INTENTIONS

## Explanatory Notes.

The summaries which follow are based solely on information relating to Japan's war potential and intentions included in reports from U. S. Military Attachés and Military Observers during the period beginning 1 January 1937 and ending 7 December 1941. These intelligence documents, a descriptive catalogue of which follows the yearly summaries, are reproduced in Far Eastern Documents, Volumes I-XV. In most cases marginal lines have been added to the documents to indicate sections pertinent to the subject.

Marginal references in the yearly summaries indicate the documents from which the information is extracted. For instance, "FE 1" refers to the first Far Eastern document. Where several sources contain essentially the same information, they are indicated in the margins but not always referred to

specifically in the text of the summaries. When the source of any statement is desired, the marginal references should be compared with the annexed table of contents of the documentary file.

The following abbreviations have been used :

MA Military Attaché or Assistant Military Attaché  
MO Military Observer

Expressions such as "Tokyo reported" or "Singapore reported" refer to reports from War Department intelligence personnel stationed at those places. Reports are included from Military Attachés or Assistant Military Attachés on duty at embassies or legations in Japan, China, Thailand, Australia, Portugal, Great Britain, and Mexico, and from Military Observers in India, Malaya, and Netherlands Indies, where no diplomatic representation was maintained.

[2] *Japan's War Potential and Intentions*

1937

FE 1 During the first half of 1937, the military leaders of Japan were  
FE 3 building up a war psychology. One of the most formidable instru-  
ments used as an army propaganda agency was the Imperial Reserv-  
ists Association, with a large and well disciplined membership scat-  
tered throughout Japan. The Army was engaged in a six-year  
FE 4 expansion program providing for (a) increase of the Air Corps and  
antiaircraft defenses; (b) increase of the military force in Man-  
choukuo; (c) improvement of military training facilities; (d) re-  
plenishment of war materials; and (e) organization of industry in  
the interest of national defense.

FE 4 In the budget debate in the Diet during the early months of the  
year, references were made to the so-called "Continental Policy"  
and "Southward Expansion". While most of the pronouncements on  
FE 2 expansion came from army leaders, there was indication of concu-  
rence by the Navy when Rear Admiral Sekine, addressing a private  
gathering, said: "Even with no naval treaty, we need not worry. Our  
duty is clearly to go ahead with our preparations for overseas  
development."

FE 16 In early July the so-called China Incident began, and what at  
FE 18 first appeared to be a local incident in North China developed into  
FE 22 a major conflict engulfing a large portion of the Chinese Republic.  
FE 24 Following the outbreak of hostilities, Japan began mobilizing the  
FE 26 Army, and the movement eventually took on the proportions of a  
general mobilization. Four divisions were added to the active army  
by reconstituting similar units disbanded in 1925.

FE 29 The Japanese War Office extended the terms of service for members  
FE 31 of mobilized units and units in China until ordered transferred to  
the reserves, except such privates as might be ordered discharged.  
Special volunteer officers and reservists of all ranks and grades called  
into active service were to serve until relieved from active service.  
For members of non-mobilized units at home stations, including con-  
script reserve privates, where the term would normally expire in  
1938, the term was extended to 1939.

FE 30 The Japanese War Office, as of 30 September, estimated that there  
were available 4,750,000 trained and partly trained reservists meet-  
ing physical requirements. The MA in Tokyo estimated Japan had  
FE 36 950,000 troops under arms as of 29 October. The Imperial Headquar-  
FE 40 ters was established in the Imperial Palace on 20 November. Only on  
two previous occasions had this headquarters been established: in  
1894, just prior to the Sino-Japanese War; and [3] in 1904,  
following the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War.

FE 23 Appropriations for the Army during 1937-38 totalled Yen 2,464,078,-  
117, including supplementary appropriations of Yen 1,422,712,777, or  
45 per cent of the expenditures voted for the year, which amounted  
to Yen 5,483,364,279.

FE 20 Few thoroughly modern army airplanes were in use in 1937, but  
prospects of improvement were excellent with an ambitious building  
program for 1937-38. The new 97 (1937) type planes compared favor-



- ably with service models of foreign nations. Contracts were let for 500 new 97 (1937) type planes for delivery by 1 July 1938. Compared with the previous year, squadron strength increased from 53 to 59. Trained pilots numbered about 1400, with 288 trained during the year. The number of obsolete planes decreased, so that the number of available planes on 1 July (1223 of all types) represented an increase of only 34 planes. Several new airplane companies were formed, and plans were made for increasing production facilities.
- FE 13
- FE 17 Legislation of a wartime character enacted at special sessions of the Diet included the "Military Secrets Protection Law," passed on 7
- FE 25 August, and the "Munitions Industry Mobilization Law," passed on
- FE 38 9 September. The Cabinet Planning Board was reorganized to plan for complete control of industry, finance and labor, in accordance with the need of the national defense program.
- FE 22 An unfriendly attitude toward foreign powers was manifested on several occasions during military operations in China. It was clearly
- FE 26 stated on 17 September by the Senior Aide to the Navy Minister that peaceful commerce with China would not be interfered with, but if a situation like that in Spain should develop, Japan might change her policy. Nevertheless, there were several incidents involving British and American nationals. The attitude toward Great Britain was
- FE 22 decidedly unfriendly, although Russia was constantly referred to as
- FE 34 the immediate and potential enemy.
- FE 32 The reaction to President Roosevelt's "Quarantine" speech of 5 October was one of shocked disappointment without any demonstration of enmity. Likewise, the sinking of the American gunboat
- FE 41 "Panay" brought an official expression of regret with offer of restitution. The public and the press expressed hope that the United States would be magnanimous in its judgment of the incident.

#### JAPAN'S WAR POTENTIAL AND INTENTIONS

[4]

1938

- FE 42 The MA in Tokyo reported on 6 January that the amicable settlement of the Panay Case should not obscure the fact that nationalistic groups in Japan harbor "considerable irritation and ill-feeling" toward the United States because of our "interference in the affairs of the Far East."
- FE 56 The Japanese often reiterated that the United States "does not
- FE 57 understand Japan" or "fully recognize the justice of Japan's stand,"
- FE 58 and in so doing they made it evident that "understanding Japan" really meant giving her a free hand in East Asia.
- FE 57 The Japanese Foreign Minister stated in March that "Japan desires stabilization in the Far East, with herself as the central figure," and that "there will be no conflict between Japan and the United States as long as they understand each other."
- FE 58 Tokyo reported on 18 March that the Shiunso Society, a Japanese nationalistic group, stated in newspaper advertisements addressed to the American people that the way for the United States to get "peace in the Orient" was to stop oppressing Japan; "respect the position of Japan, the greatest power in the Orient; . . . make absolutely no political activity or economic operations having political significance without the understanding of Japan; . . . guide other Powers to take the same attitude."
- FE 62 The enactment of the General Mobilization Law on 24 March
- FE 65 laid the foundation for totalitarian control and for complete war-
- FE 66 time mobilization of Japan's economy and manpower. This law,
- FE 68 which was originally passed with the specific assurance that it
- FE 69 would not be invoked for the "China Incident," virtually suspended
- FE 78 the constitution and enabled the Government, through the issuance
- FE 87 of Imperial Ordinances, to mobilize and regulate the human and material resources of the Empire exclusively for war. The Minister of War told the Japanese Army Division Commanders in April that there must be a mobilization of the entire Japanese strength "because the end of the China incident was remote and
- FE 62

- the changes in the international situation were difficult to predict." Tokyo reported on 12 May that the Japanese War Ministry planned to issue a pamphlet which emphasized that "Japan is facing a crisis in which the fortune of the nation is at stake" and that "only by strengthening this general mobilization system can the ambitions of a third power be restrained." On 15 November the MA in Tokyo outlined the process by which the [5] General Mobilization Law was gradually being put into full effect through the piecemeal application of the various provisions at times when propaganda or military successes made conditions favorable.
- FE 66
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- With the extension of military operations in China during 1938 the mobilized strength of the Japanese Army steadily increased. On 26 March the MA in China reported that a total of 1,200,000 Japanese troops were under arms. Various measures to strengthen the military conscription system, to increase the efficiency of military training, and to begin to utilize the manpower of Japan's colonies for military purposes were reported during 1938. The MA in Tokyo reported on 18 January that the new law to require two years of military service by all conscripts in the Japanese Infantry, regardless of preconscription training, was necessary because of the need for "further training of soldiers in the varied weapons now in use." An Imperial Ordinance, effective 3 April, provided that all Japanese subjects, including Koreans, Formosans, Ainu, and South Sea Islanders, above the age of 17, might volunteer for the Army, subject to selection and physical examination. Under this new program 400 Koreans were selected for training in 1938. Under the leadership of General Araki, Minister of Education, the Japanese educational system put increased emphasis on Japanese nationalism and military training.
- In commenting on the continued strengthening of Japanese home air defenses, the MA in Tokyo reported on 11 April that the Japanese were not greatly worried over the prospects of air raids by Chinese but that they were "drawing plans to combat potential danger from any source" and were "taking advantage of the present emergency to organize and train personnel on a nation-wide basis for coordination with military preparations." On 14 May the MA in Tokyo reported Japanese plans for the construction of 28 new airdromes near large cities and of double purpose parks-emergency landing fields in Japanese villages.
- Tokyo reported on 19 April that appropriations for the Army during 1938-39 totalled Yen 3,823,594,189 (compared with Yen 2,464,078,117 for the fiscal year 1937-38) of which Yen 2,259,000,000 represented appropriations for the "China Incident" (against supplemental appropriations of Yen 1,422,712,777 during 1937-38).
- In the spring of 1938 the Japanese Government launched a vigorous "spiritual mobilization" program to secure on the home [6] front the fullest possible support of the war in China. The MA in Tokyo reported on 14 May: "The response of the people appears to be all that could be desired. . . . With stoic determination the people have set to fight a serious war." Tokyo reported "as significant" that General Araki, Minister of Education, stated in a speech on 2 July that Japan possessed the perfect social system and therefore had become the center of the world. General Araki emphasized Japan's "mission" to unite the cultures of the Orient and the Occident in accordance with the "Imperial Principle."
- Tokyo reported on 1 July that the Japanese Army Air Corps was undergoing a "most widespread modernization program." On 1 July the number of Army planes was estimated to be 1,455 with 305 additional planes ordered but not delivered. The increase in first-line army planes from 782 to 1,093 and the decrease in obsolescent planes from 435 to 359 during the preceding 12 months was "due largely to the tremendous Army production program which commenced during the spring of 1937 and continues at present." Japanese aircraft production facilities were unable to meet the increased demands of the Army and Navy, however, and the Army bought 80 Fiat bombers abroad. During the preceding year Japanese army squadron



strength increased from 59 to 80, and on 1 July army pilots numbered 1,600, with 350 trained during the preceding 12 months.

FE 67 Increasing Japanese irritation over the foreign aid rendered the  
FE 71 Chinese Government by foreign powers was reflected in numerous  
FE 72 reports from the Far East during 1938. France was especially  
FE 73 singled out for allowing the use of French Indo-China railways  
FE 76 in transporting material to the Chinese and for objecting to Japan's  
FE 77 apparent intention of occupying Hainan Island.

FE 84  
FE 85 The MA in China on 15 July quoted Prince Konoe as saying that  
FE 76 "foreign aid alone is prolonging the life of the Chiang Kai-shek regime" and that "Japan would take both economic and diplomatic measures to dissuade the foreign powers from aiding Chiang Kai-shek."

FE 67 While the Japanese were using discriminatory measures and other  
FE 71 pressure against French, English, and American interests in  
FE 84 Japanese-occupied territories in the hope of stopping foreign aid  
FE 67 to China, Germany tried to strengthen its ties with Japan by such acts as the recognition of Manchoukuo on 12 May, the ban on German exports of arms to China in June, and the withdrawal of German military advisers from China in July.

[7]

FE 72 Russo-Japanese relations remained strained as a result of con-  
FE 77 tinued delay in renewal of the fishing agreement and of recurrent  
FE 78 border incidents, especially the fighting at Changkufeng during July  
FE 81 and August.

FE 79 During the European crisis over Czechoslovakia in September,  
FE 80 the MA in China reported by radio that a Japanese-controlled newspaper in Tientsin and a Japanese military spokesman in Shanghai indicated that Japan was prepared to support Germany and Italy even to the point of war.

FE 84 After the League of Nations authorized the imposition of economic sanctions upon Japan, but left it up to the individual nations to take action as they saw fit, the MA in China commented on 12 October that such decisions mean nothing unless strong nations "are willing to go to war to back them up." Japan answered this action of the League of Nations by severing all relations with that organization on 2 November, but the Japanese retained their Mandated Islands.

FE 86 Tokyo reported that the United States note of 6 October relating to the Nine Power Treaty brought Japanese newspaper comments, probably government-inspired, to the effect that this treaty was "out-moded" and could not "be made a cloak for political interference with Japan's aims."

FE 59 The Japanese Army continued its advance in China, having  
FE 76 overrun over 500,000 square miles of territory in China by the  
FE 85 end of 1938. Japan began to consolidate her military and economic  
FE 58 gains in North and Central China. In order to strengthen the  
FE 71 Japanese military machine, the semi-official North China Development Company and Central China Development Company placed  
FE 75 their main emphasis upon the expansion of communication and  
FE 72 transportation facilities and the production of iron, steel, coal, and synthetic oil.

[8]

1939

FE 91 The occupation of Hainan Island early in 1939, Tokyo reported on  
13 February, gave Japan the following advantages: (1) it provided an air base close to Burma and French Indo-China; (2) it made possible a naval blockade of South China; (3) it brought French and British holdings in South China under Japanese guns; (4) it threatened Manila with encirclement; and (5) it added a second "Formosa" to Japan's island possessions. On 28 February Tokyo interpreted the significance of recent Japanese pressure upon French Indo-China and related to this aggression the strategic implications involved: "The occupation of Hainan is so obvious a form of pressure on the French that it is universally assigned a political motive of retaliation, in spite

FE 93

of official denials. Occupation of the island not only gives Japan a potential naval base right in the front-yard of Indo-China, but it also provides a close-in base for immediate air operations to cut the supply routes leading into China from French territory." Concurrently, the MA evaluated the reaction of the Japanese press to "recent manifestations of U. S. foreign policy": "These developments [i. e., United States sale of war planes to France and proposed fortification of Guam], along with the parallel diplomatic action by the United States, England and France concerning Hainan and previous issues, are widely interpreted as indications of abandonment by the U. S. administration of the isolationist tradition of U. S. foreign policy, and of an alignment of the democratic powers against the authoritarian states including Japan." Subsequently, on 7 March, the MA in China reported the Japanese occupation of Hainan as a strategic move directed toward French Indo-China, Hongkong, Singapore, and the Philippines rather than a military expedient for current operations in China.

FE 95

FE 96

On 8 March Tokyo forwarded further evidence of Japanese legislative measures designed to bring the nation closer to a war footing. Of particular significance was the proposal of a new "Law for the Protection of Secrets Concerning Military Resources," supplementing the provisions of the Military Secrets Protection Law of October 1937.

FE 99

On 23 March the MA in Tokyo reported that Japan was preparing a three-year plan for expansion of production of strategic materials and products in Japan, China and Manchoukuo in order to attain self-sufficiency. The MA stated that the government intended to spend 13 billion yen on the project and that in his opinion the degree of dependence on foreign sources in wartime would as a result be considerably reduced.

[9]

FE 102

On 1 April the MA in Tokyo commented on and forwarded to the War Department a tactical study made by an Army officer under his command. The study reviewed tactical doctrines of the Japanese Army, as modified by the new combat regulations of 1939 and by observation of current military operations in China. The report stated that the Japanese were making great efforts to modernize the Army, were spending large sums on aviation, motorization, and mechanization, and were increasing the strength of the division artillery. They were at the same time endeavoring to increase the efficiency of their military organization and tactical operation.

In the light of these improvements, the report concluded:

"The division which started the China Incident will not be the division of a future war. Increased material means will facilitate the task of Japanese tactics. Tactics are without meaning unless studied in relation to the human agent who will apply them in battle. This study has avoided excursions into the field of Japanese military psychology and national characteristics; however, it should be read with a constant eye to the nature of the Japanese Army for which these tactics are designed. It is an army easily misjudged by the foreign officer who sees first of all its straggling columns, slovenly dress and unmilitary bearing. Just as there is no glitter to its accoutrements, there is little theoretical excellence to recommend its tactics. But it is an army which excels in durability and performance. In the same way that its infantry "straggles" thirty miles a day and arrives at the destination on time and with surprisingly few casualties, its command and staff can be counted on to evolve plans and orders which, without being brilliant tactical combinations, are practical and workable schemes for getting a maximum performance from the Japanese soldier. Furthermore, the Japanese Army which fought with bows and arrows seventy years ago is thoroughly capable of learning from its mistakes and advancing with the new developments of warfare. While its swaggering self-confidence may receive some rude jolts in a major war, it is a rugged army fired with a devotion to duty and a narrow patriotism which make it a dangerous foe on a field of its own choosing."



- FE 103 The rapid expansion of Japanese armaments was reflected in the 1939-40 budget passed by the Diet. On 10 April Tokyo reported that the sum for defense amounted to Yen 6,432,155,345, which was 68.35 per cent of the total budget. Both the Army and the Navy were being improved and modernized, and large sums were allocated to artillery, aviation, motorization, and new ships.
- FE 104 Tokyo reported on 12 April further legislation enacted to establish the nation upon a more secure war footing. Articles 2 [10] and 6 of the National General Mobilization Law were invoked to provide (1) governmental limitation of dividends, and (2) governmental regulation of a maximum working day of 12 hours and of wages in factories employing more than 50 workers.
- FE 105 In April, the MA in Japan, reviewing the trend of military avia-  
FE 106 tion toward expansion, stated that since the beginning of the war in China, the personnel and aircraft strength of the Army Air Corps had increased 60 per cent, production had increased 125 per cent, and new construction of plants had enlarged production facilities by 40 per cent.
- FE 110 Tokyo on 7 June reported a revision of the Military Service Law which extended the term of service in the Conscript Reserve from 12 years 4 months to 17 years 4 months and the training period of reservists to include the Second Conscript Reserve.
- FE 111 On 9 June the MA in Tokyo reported on the series of disputes occurring toward the end of May and early in June between the Japanese and British over control of the British and French Concessions at Tientsin and the International Settlement at Shanghai. Ill feeling between the Japanese and the British was described as acute, particularly in Tientsin.
- FE 113 On 1 July, Tokyo reported that the Army Air Corps, during the  
FE 74 preceding year, had increased to 106 squadrons from 80; planes to 1961 from 1093; and pilot strength to 2900 from 1600.
- FE 115 The MA in China, reporting on 13 July with reference to the anti-British campaign of the Japanese, pointed out that "the Japanese credo is to drive out all western influence from China"; that the time for an anti-American campaign would come; and that Japanese extremists and conservatives were agreed on the necessity for Japanese dominance in Asia.
- FE 116 The MA in China, in a report dated 14 July, estimated the strength of the Japanese Army in China to be 840,000 men, and 240,000 additional men in Manchoukuo.
- FE 120 The MA in Tokyo reported on 15 August that as a result of changes in conscription regulations, the estimated strength of the standing army will be 800,000 men, with an annual enrollment of 400,000 men.
- FE 122 Tokyo reported on 12 September that the Japanese were taken aback by the announcement on 26 July of the American abrogation of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. The press claimed that the [11] United States Government was abandoning the isolationist tradition of foreign policy and was entering the alignment of democratic powers against the authoritarian states, including Japan. The government had adopted a "wait-and-see" course, being deterred, according to the MA, from exploiting an opportunity to push the hardpressed British only because of apprehension of Russia.
- On the same date the MA in Japan estimated the future course of Japanese foreign policy, particularly with reference to the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, as follows: "Under present conditions, it can safely be said that Japanese foreign policy will be directed toward a settlement of the China incident as rapidly as possible, and an avoidance, if possible, of any entanglements of any sort until a settlement of the China war shall have been realized."
- FE 124 Tokyo reported on 20 September that the Japanese government was concerned over possible loss of exports as a result of the China war and was taking steps toward reducing electric consumption on non-essential lines. The MA stated that the power shortage touched many points in the national economy and was a vital matter, although Japan, in his opinion, could fill the military need of manpower through the use of female labor or other devices to maintain electric power at a necessary level.

- FE 129 The MA in Shanghai dispatched on 1 October to the War Department a memorandum containing estimates of Japanese imperialistic designs in relation to the European war: "In the realm of foreign affairs Japan's immediate policy will be directed toward placating the United States and toward taking advantage of the present European embroglio to secure as many plums as possible. . . . Japan is reported to be watching carefully . . . the Dutch East Indies. It is rumored that Japan is waiting for the propitious moment to take advantage of British and French preoccupation to make a swoop in that direction. . . . Leap frogging Hongkong, French Indo-China and Singapore, the Japanese Navy could bring an irresistible force to bear and easily lop off this rich prize."
- FE 132 On 1 November the same source defined the probability of an impending Japanese-American conflict and reported: "[The] Japanese realize that the United States is the greatest potential threat to the attainment of their 'Manifest Destiny' . . . Regardless of the final outcome, we may expect early retaliation for any decisive action we may take against Japan."
- FE 133 Tokyo reported on 6 November (subsequent to the speech of Ambassador Grew of 19 October expressing unfavorable American opinion toward Japanese aspirations and activities in China, that [12] attempts on the part of the United States to apply economic pressure upon Japan would result in "a refusal to accept such pressure supinely and a turning toward such more sympathetic nations as may be available." The imminence of Japanese realignment incidental to such economic pressure was thus estimated: "Should the European struggle develop into a world war through participation by the United States, the grouping of Germany, Japan, and possibly Russia and Italy is a combination which under some circumstances could be very embarrassing to the United States as a belligerent in a world war."
- FE 134 An impending crisis in Japanese-American relations was reported on 20 November by the MA in Japan. Included among citations of threatening Japanese policy were the Japanese War Minister's assertions that the Army intended to press the China Incident to a successful conclusion "without over-much regard for public opinion" and that, although abrogation of the Japanese-American commercial treaty would undeniably affect Japan's material mobilization plans, "this situation can be met and our policy toward the United States should be a strong one."
- FE 138 The year closed with the Japanese opening the lower Yangtze River. With reference to this move, the MA in Japan, in his report of 22 December, estimated that such conciliatory policies might temporarily ease relations but had little long-run significance in view of the ambitious continental policy of the Japanese, from which they were "not likely to be diverted except by force of arms or circumstances."
- [13] 1940
- FE 140 Reporting on 11 January that the imminent fall of the Abe Cabinet was due in part to Japanese concern over the approaching non-treaty status with the United States, the MA in China stated that Japanese political and military leaders "are anxious to appease us only until their 'immutable policy' of a Far Eastern hegemony is well on the road to accomplishment. Thereafter they feel they can disregard American opinion and pressure with impunity."
- FE 141 Following the expiration of the Japanese-American trade treaty  
FE 142 on 26 January, the Japanese felt that relations with the United States were in a "state of delicate balance." Tokyo reported that Japanese abrogation of the trade treaty with the Dutch might be the first step toward an eventual attempt at economic domination of the Netherlands Indies.
- FE 144 The Japanese interpreted the new twenty-million-dollar American loan made to the Chinese Government in March as further evidence of American determination to try to thwart Japan's China program. The Japanese were pushing plans for setting up the Wang Ching-wei regime in Occupied China.



FE 146 The American non-recognition policy toward the Wang Ching-wei regime was interpreted by the Japanese as additional proof of our determination to try to check the Japanese in China, but Tokyo reported on 10 April that the Japanese were hopeful of making a deal with England and France whereby those nations would not oppose Japan's China policy in return for assurances of Japan's neutrality in the European war.

FE 147 Tokyo reported on 24 April that rumors of an imminent German attack on Holland were current in Japan, and that the Japanese demand for the maintenance of the *status quo* of the Netherlands Indies "was so presented as to invite the conclusion that it was intended to pave the way for intervention by the Japanese themselves."

FE 149 The increase in the Japanese Army budget for 1940-41 was accounted for by plans to reorganize the Army Air Corps and to replenish and improve armaments, Tokyo reported on 16 May. A chart of continuing expenditures for the years following 1940 indicated efforts to bring the equipment of the Japanese Army up-to-date as quickly as possible, but the decrease in the "China Incident" budget showed that new large-scale campaigns were not expected in China.

[14]

FE 148 After the German invasion of Holland, Tokyo reported increasing Japanese concern over the status of the Netherlands Indies. Concentrations of Japanese troops on the islands of Formosa and Hainan were reported on 7 June from Tokyo, while a report dated 10 June stated that the impending American embargo on the export of machine tools had created "quite a furore" in Japan and that agitation for "positive action" against the Netherlands Indies was increasing.

FE 152 The MA in China reported large Japanese military, naval, and air force concentrations on Hainan Island. The present goal is apparently French Indo-China, this report of 12 June added, but the "ultimate objective is of course complete domination of the East Asian seaboard."

FE 153 The MA in Tokyo estimated that Japan had on 1 July a minimum of 4040 Army and Navy airplanes of all types, with 1510 additional planes contracted for and not delivered; a total of 4565 officers, 1350 cadets, and 63,045 enlisted men in the Army Air Corps and Naval Air Service, including 5950 pilots; and a total of 238 air combat squadrons, composed of 114 in the Army Air Corps and 124 in the Naval Air Services. Further improvement in military aviation was expected with the establishment of the Hokota Army Air School for training in light bombing, as this would release the facilities at the Hamamatsu Army Air School for more extensive training in heavy bombardment and would be conducive to more efficient training in both light and heavy bombardment.

FE 154 On 11 July Tokyo reported that within Japan "the situation is at present sharply drawn between those who favor a closer tie-up with Germany and prompt action against Allied possessions in the Far East, and those who, distrusting Germany or feeling that immediate action is not necessary or desirable, would continue to concentrate on accomplishment of the China venture." Pending a decision, the Japanese Army concentrated troops, ready for action, opposite both Hong-kong and the French Indo-China border.

FE 155 Tokyo reported that Army Districts in Japan were being reorganized, effective 1 August, to increase the efficiency of the Japanese Army for national defense, training, and administration.

FE 158 In the opinion of the MA in Tokyo the shakeup in the Japanese foreign service probably indicated an effort to remove men who were pro-American or pro-Allied. He reported on 4 September that the number of Japanese advocating an alignment with the Rome-Berlin Axis was increasing and that from a military standpoint the Japanese Army would not find it difficult "to take over the northern part of Indo-China."

[15]

FE 159 On 19 September Tokyo reported that the Japanese Army continued to avoid further commitments in China in order to be ready for action

if and when a favorable opportunity presented itself for a new venture elsewhere. If the European war seemed to point to a long-drawn-out struggle, the Japanese would eventually decide to seize the desired territories, counting on having time to organize their conquests for defense against the final European victor. The Japanese felt that the United States was certain to object to this expansion, was likely to retaliate by economic means, and might possibly oppose aggression with armed force. The Japanese believed that time would be on their side, however, as they felt it would be years before America's naval and military strength could be built up sufficiently for major operations in the Far East as long as the German menace still existed. The most radical immediate action, however, would probably be a move across French Indo-China, with or without acquiescence, to hasten the conclusion of the China War.

FE 160 Tokyo reported on 5 October that the Tripartite Pact had been signed after Japan realized that the United States was irreconcilably opposed to Japanese expansion in Asia. Japan had decided to change her traditional policy of "at least quiet relations" with the United States and to pursue a course to satisfy her national ambitions. The statement of Prince Konoe, in which he flatly declared that the question of peace or war in the Pacific "will be decided by whether Japan and the United States respect and understand the stand of each other" expressed the determination of the Japanese not to be dissuaded from their present ambitions by any half-way measures. Other reports from Japan and China during October emphasized the tense state of Japanese-American relations and the probability of continued Japanese aggression.

FE 161  
FE 162  
FE 163  
FE 164 On 31 October the MA in China reported that if a nonaggression pact could be signed with Russia, Japan would probably continue her southern expansion regardless of its effect on Japanese-American relations.

FE 165 Details of a new "Ten-Year-Plan" to weld Japan, China, and Manchoukuo into a close-knit economic unit were transmitted by the MA in Tokyo on 18 November, with comment on the great potential strength of Japan's economic position if such plans were to succeed.

FE 166 The MA in London forwarded on 20 November a report on the Japanese Army which stated, among other things, that the Japanese were probably ahead of most Western nations in landing and [16] combined operations. Special mention was made of the emphasis which the Japanese put on outflanking and enveloping movements in attacking and on morale and endurance in training army personnel. Japan was estimated to have had 1,350,000 men under arms, of whom 1,000,000 had had active service experience, as of December, 1939. This report concluded that "the Japanese army is a formidable fighting machine but has not yet reached the standard of efficiency of Western armies. It is, however, trained for and will probably only required to fight in Eastern Asia where it will have inherent advantages over an opponent."

FE 167. Reports from both China and Japan discussed the Japanese Army's  
FE 168 evacuation of Kwangsi Province in November, and indicated that Japan's next move might be into southern French Indo-China.

FE 168 The MA in China, in commenting on Japan's plane with regard to the troops being assembled on the islands of Formosa and Hainan, observed that "some even presume an attack on the Philippines via Lingayen Gulf."

FE 169 Tokyo reported on 12 December that Ambassador Nomura's mission to try to improve Japanese-American relations was probably "doomed from the start" because the Japanese Government was "completely in the hands of the more chauvinistic elements" and was not prepared to make concessions in the Japanese program for East Asia which would be acceptable to American opinion.

[17]

1941

FE 170 In forwarding the English text of the Japan-Thailand Treaty of Amity, the Tokyo MA on 11 January called attention to the progress of Japanese designs on French Indo-China and on bases for operations against Malaya and Singapore.



- FE 174 In February Tokyo reported on the extreme character of the National Defense Security Act and said that its immediate effect would be closure of many sources of information. The MA in
- FE 172 China reported that Japan was promoting border trouble in order to profit as a mediator "preserving the peace" between Thailand and French Indo-China. He also commented on Japan's warnings to the
- FE 173 United States that she would tolerate no interference in developing the East Asia economic bloc, on her inclusion of the Netherlands Indies in this bloc, and on the reports that many Japanese divisions were being trained on Formosa and Hainan, all of which indicated plans to move southward. He believed that under certain conditions Japan would move directly on the Netherlands Indies.
- FE 175 On 1 March Chungking reported that foreigners generally believed Japan's move on Singapore and the Netherlands Indies depended upon the outcome of Germany's offensive against England.
- FE 177 The Military Observer at Singapore on 22 March reviewed the
- FE 178 disposition of British forces in Malaya with approval, but predicted difficulties in meeting flank attacks and in maintaining signal communications. He also reported that the Japanese were reconnoitering the northern border of Malaya.
- FE 179 On 18 April Tokyo pointed out that although the newly-concluded Japanese-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact obviously freed Japan on one front and enabled her to prepare for issues elsewhere, it removed none of the basic differences of opinion between the two countries.
- FE 180 Tokyo reported the establishment of an Army Mechanization Headquarters charged with research into, and supervision of, training in the use of mechanized equipment.
- FE 181 Meanwhile on 2 May Tokyo cabled a warning that the reported increases of Japanese strength in Formosa, Hainan, and French Indo-China were greater than normal for the China Incident and that these forces "may be there in readiness for a move against Singapore or East Indies." A report on field operations from Tokyo,
- FE 184 21 May, warned that the Japanese would probably attempt [18] an all-out drive to conclude the China Incident in order to have a free hand for southward expansion if the United States should become involved in the war in Europe. In transmitting the Japanese Army Budget for the fiscal year 1941-42, the Tokyo MA contrasted it with the budget for the preceding year and pointed out that the China Incident expenditures alone could not explain its expansion.
- FE 185 On 29 May Chungking forwarded Chinese estimates that Japan had 2000 Navy planes and 2500 Army planes.
- FE 186 On 3 June Tokyo wrote: "\* \* \* two new Inspectorates have been established, the Chemical Warfare Inspectorate and the Communications Inspectorate, thus considerably raising these two forms of military activity above the places which they have heretofore occupied in the Japanese services." Tokyo also reported on the
- FE 187 yellow fever inoculations given in May to certain officers attached to northern units, on the training for transport of troops and supplies by air, and on parachute troop training. The Japanese Government at this time was said to be facing great difficulty in preserving restraint vis-a-vis internal public pressure for strong, direct action toward the Netherlands Indies after the failure of the trade negotiations at Batavia.
- FE 194
- FE 189 The Singapore MO believed that the Japanese would not move without a 50-50 chance for success. He expressed the opinion on 5 June that the Japanese were forcing economic penetration of Thailand and Indo-China, to be followed by military occupation in readiness for any advantage to be had from weakened British or American positions in that area. "With regards to defense of Malaya," he continued, "it is believed that the present forces of approximately 60,000 Army and 5,000 Royal Air Force personnel can contain for six months or more the force of six divisions and 1,000 planes which it is estimated Japan can now send against them."
- FE 190 Hongkong reported that on 14 June 27 Japanese transports conveyed by 21 destroyers were off the China coast travelling southward,
- FE 192 and were expected to be off Hongkong on 17 June. On 25 June Hongkong further reported that three convoys, totalling about 50 trans-

ports, had been seen during the preceding fortnight and were believed to have gone to the Pescadores or Formosa. The MA in Mexico forwarded a report that the Japanese were constructing special small submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, and that a training program then under way included towing them from Japan to positions off the Hawaiian Islands, where they practiced surfacing and submerging.

[19]

FE 193 Chungking believed that the sudden German offensive against Russia had caused a temporary lull in the threatening attitude toward the United States, and on 27 June cabled the opinion that the Japanese would be reluctant to make a major move until results of border incidents revealed the potential strength of the Russians.

FE 197 On 12 July Tokyo cabled: "Considerable scale of mobilization and unusual secrecy attending it now beyond question." Tokyo  
FE 196 believed the Government, however, was still seeking to avoid positive commitments. Two days later Tokyo cabled that it was "now evident that large scale mobilization under way covered by unusual secrecy. Some newly mobilized men being sent to Manchoukuo but unable to determine number or whether any being sent south."  
FE 199 Hongkong reported that 19 Japanese transports were moving southward from Formosa on 12 July.

FE 200 Chinese Military Intelligence was reported on 15 July to anticipate an early invasion of French Indo-China and to believe that areas newly ceded to Thailand were to be used as air bases.

FE 201 On 21 July Singapore reported that the Japanese had delivered a virtual ultimatum, with a 20 July deadline, in which they demanded the use of naval bases in southern French Indo-China. "If the French refuse, regardless of British or United States interference, the bases will be taken forcibly."

FE 204 London on 22 July reported belief that the Japanese had completed all preparations for taking over French Indo-China bases.

FE 206 On 26 July Tokyo cabled: "Largest single draft since initial mobilization for China War now under way under conditions extreme secrecy involving restrictions on movements foreigners in all directions." Some Japanese in Tokyo interpreted the 26 July freezing of Japanese credits by the United States as the first step toward a final break with America.

FE 208 Singapore on 29 July estimated that Japanese strength in French Indo-China was approaching 40,000 men and believed there would be forcible seizure of additional bases.

FE 209 Japan demanded the right to occupy Thai naval and air bases, and on 31 July Bangkok commented: "An immediate Nipponese move is anticipated due to Thai indecision."

[20]

FE 211 Estimates were forwarded from London on 3 August that more  
FE 220 than 500,000 Japanese were mobilized during June and July, and further British estimates, forwarded from Chungking, 20 August, placed Japanese strength at 49 divisions, with 54 available by the end of August when mobilization would be complete.

FE 212 The MA in Tokyo estimated that Japan had on 1 July 3200 Army  
(FE 153) airplanes (1940 estimate was 2010); a total of 3600 officers, 1600 cadets and 34,800 enlisted men (1940 estimate was 2900 officers, 1350 cadets and 28,700 enlisted men) in the Army Air corps, including 3900 pilots (1940—3100 pilots); and 136 air combat squadrons in the Army Air Corps (1940—114 combat air squadrons).

FE 213 Tokyo estimated on 5 August that the aircraft industry, working at maximum wartime capacity, could produce annually the equivalent of 4,500 two-place, single-engine military airplanes. Actual production for the period 1 July 1940 to 30 June 1941 was estimated to be 2,730 combat aircraft. It was concluded that since the end of 1939 the aircraft industry had increased production by about one-half and capacity by about two-thirds, while completion of construction then in



sight would give a capacity double that of 1939. The number of employees engaged in the manufacture of airplanes had increased 55 per cent, and employees in engine manufacturing plants had increased in number 57 per cent from 1938-39 to 1940-41.

FE 218 Chungking reported 15 August Japanese plans to take over international concessions and to capture American marines in Shanghai by surprise.

FE 219 Chungking on 19 August forwarded British estimates that Japanese tank strength, exclusive of baby tanks and armored machine gun cars, was ten regiments, each consisting of 160 tanks, with an equal number in reserve.

FE 224 In addition the MA at Chungking on 27 August forwarded a Russian estimate that the actual strength of the Japanese Army was 48 divisions and 20 independent brigades (approximately 58 divisions), with 300,000 men in training, possibly ready in three months. Uncalled reserves were believed to number 210,000. Eleven divisions could be organized from reserves already trained and 16 from those then in training. These figures include corps, army, and service troops. Artillery was believed to be insufficient. The total potential strength was estimated by the Russians to be 76 divisions.

[21]

FE 222 On 21 August Tokyo reported that drastic shipping control measures were about to be instituted by the Japanese Cabinet. Tokyo also  
FE 223 reported five main forces, composed of ten armies (54 divisions), located overseas.

FE 226 On 1 September the Tokyo MA reported on the organization and high quality of the Japanese military signal communications system, and commented that Japanese radio equipment was "comparable to our own in every respect."

FE 229 On 11 September Tokyo made a full report on the National mobilization which had begun 3 June. In his opinion "in round numbers about 700,000 were called up during this mobilization." This number did not include the home defense "National Army," which was called up for five days' training. "The number of men mobilized was far too great for mere replacement purposes in existing divisions now in Japan or on the Continent . . . While estimates of other foreign observers place the total number of men mobilized as high as 1,250,000, it is believed that these estimates . . . [are too high]." About 90 per cent of the total of 18,000 horses also mobilized at this time were known to have gone south rather than direct to Manchoukuo or Korea.

FE 230 Japan set up a National Defense General Headquarters (reported by Tokyo on 16 September) in a move to improve arrangements for the defense of Japan Proper.

FE 231 Invocation of the last drastic measures of the 1938 National Mobilization Law (revised) and a tense political atmosphere indicated, according to Tokyo, that the day for a final decision on "immutable" policies was drawing near. Internally the nation was mobilizing for total war.

FE 239 On 14 October Hongkong reported the presence of 22 transports on the Pearl River.

FE 240 The China MA cabled on 17 October: "Increased Nazi activity in Japan plus the cabinet crisis and attacks on U. S. by spokesmen and press considered strong evidence of drastic action in the near future."

FE 242 Commenting on heavy troop movements into French Indo-China, Tokyo concluded on 20 October: "If the rumored increase goes above the number originally agreed upon there cannot remain much doubt as to the intention behind it."

[22]

FE 243 Tokyo reported on 20 October that General Tojo, on becoming Premier, retained his status as an officer on the active list, an unusual

procedure, and concluded that the third Konoe cabinet fell because of inability to meet army criticism of its policy toward French Indo-China, the conversations in Washington, and its policy vis-a-vis a weakened Russia.

FE 245 London cabled on 21 October: "Japanese troops in Indo-China will be strengthened as follows: 36,000 there now; an estimated 20,000 enroute, and an additional 20,000 included in Japanese plans." Chung-  
FE 246 king on 23 October reported the official French Indo-Chinese view to be that the Japanese would attack Thailand about 15 November.

FE 247 A general southward movement of Japanese shipping in the Western Pacific was reported on 27 October from Singapore, together with intelligence that two aircraft carriers and 60 flying boats, fighters and bombers were operating in the Mandated Islands.

FE 249 Under pretext of surveying a new commercial air route the Japanese made a number of flights between Palau (Pelew) and Timor, violating at the same time certain provisions of the agreement granting them the privilege of flying over Dutch territory. Unusual passenger lists, the absence of commercial justification, the type of equipment, and the movement of guard vessels were reported on by the MO at Bandoeng on 30 October.

FE 248 On 29 October the MA in Chungking radioed that Japanese strength in French Indo-China was then 57,000 troops, and that it was steadily increasing in numbers. He anticipated a possible drive through

FE 250 Yunnan toward the Burma Road. Thailand was reported ready to capitulate in the hope that the country would be saved from the ravages of war.

FE 262 The Japanese Consul General at Batavia was reported to have recommended that on the outbreak of war all Japanese should report promptly to the Netherlands Indies authorities for internment, thus  
FE 253 avoiding violence. The Singapore BMritish, however, were reported by the MO to believe that no attack could be expected before April because of the prevailing northeast monsoon over Malaya.

FE 254 The MA in London forwarded on 9 November a British opinion that Japan no longer felt that it must make every effort to avoid war with the United States and that Japan would find it too difficult to attack Malaya or the Burma Road and hence might be expected to attack Netherlands Indies .

[23]

FE 256 On 16 November Tokyo estimated production of aircraft at 200 planes per month for the Army. All factories in the aircraft industry had gone on a 3-shift 24-hour day in mid-June. The MA estimated that the current monthly maximum for production was 420 military planes, including trainers.

FE 258 The London MA on 21 November cabled a summary of British Intelligence as of 18 November, in which it was stated that failure of agreement in the Washington talks would require a major Japanese decision whether to risk probable war; that Japan would probably not attack Siberia at that time; that unless agreement was reached in Washington, the war in China would continue; that Japan probably did not intend to attack the Burma Road at that time; and that the occupation of Thailand, the best possibility for the moment, would pave the way for subsequent attack upon Malaya, yet minimize the risk of a general war.

FE 264 The Singapore MO advised the War Department on 2 December that the alert in Malaya had been advanced from the third to the second degree on the previous day. Japanese reconnaissance activities over Malaya were reported.

FE 260 The MA in Melbourne radioed that on 6 December the Netherlands  
FE 268 Far East Command, upon learning of Japanese naval moves on Menado and/or Ambon out of Palau, had ordered the execution of Plan A-2.



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WAR DEPARTMENT,  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2,  
*Washington, D. C., November 5, 1941.*

Subject: Letter of transmittal.

To: Commanding General, Alaska Defense Force.

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action as you consider advisable.

Sherman Miles,  
SHERMAN MILES,  
*Brigadier General, U. S. Army,  
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.*

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WAR DEPARTMENT,  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2,  
*Washington, D. C., November 5, 1941.*

Subject: Letter of transmittal.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, Philippine Department.

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action as you consider advisable.

Sherman Miles,  
SHERMAN MILES,  
*Brigadier General, U. S. Army,  
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.*

1. Enclosures: 336. (11-3-41)—MID Summ. of Info. re Information Received from the orient: dtd. FMH

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WAR DEPARTMENT,  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2,  
*Washington, D. C., November 5, 1941.*

Subject: Letter of transmittal.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,  
Headquarters, Puerto Rican Dept.

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action as you consider advisable.

Sherman Miles,  
SHERMAN MILES,  
*Brigadier General, U. S. Army,  
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.*

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